
















Using mergers and acquisitions as a natural experiment, this paper analyzes how changes 
in workers’ status in the workplace affect their turnover decisions. The evidence suggests 
that workers have different preferences for status depending on reference group. When 
compared with co-workers in the same occupation, workers positively value their status. 
However, when compared with workers in other occupations in the same firm, workers 
negatively value their status. Workers seem to give up absolute wage increase for higher 
status within occupation, which suggests that preference for status stems from status’ 
social value, not from its instrumental value for future income. 
 
 
     2
One of the most basic social phenomena is that people compare their circumstances and 
attributes with those of others.
1 For example, they may compare their wage, authority, or 
beauty, with that of co-workers, neighbors, and friends. The perceived relative standings, 
called  status,  can  lead  to  frustration  or  satisfaction,  which  in  turn  can  affect  job 
performance and turnovers.  
Although status is one of the most central concepts in sociology, it has been slow 
to make inroads into mainstream economics.
2  To bridge this gap we set out to answer 
three empirical questions. Using changes in workers’ status, as measured by relative pay 
or relative rank, during mergers and acquisitions (henceforth M&A), we ask: (i) whether 
people care about their status at all; (ii) which reference group(s) matters for status in the 
workplace; and (iii) whether workers care more about status for social reasons such as 
prestige and respect, or for pecuniary reasons such as wage growth. 
Research on status has provided new insights in personnel policy, organization 
design, and market strategy (Martin 1981, Fershtman, Weiss, and Hvide 2001, Besley 
and Ghatak 2008), aggregate consumption (Veblen 1949; Duesenberry 1949; Bourdieu 
1984), wage compression (Frank 1985), internal labor market (Gylfason and Lindbeck 
1984, Solow 1990), involuntary unemployment (Akerlof and Yellen 1990), saving and 
growth (Fershtman et al. 1996), tax policy (Boskin and Sheshinksi 1978, Abel 2005), 
income distribution (Becker et al. 2005), market competition (Podolny 2005), and social 
welfare (Durkheim 1951, Townsend 1979). 
                                                 
1 See Jasso (1990) for a comprehensive survey of comparison theories in sociology.  
2 There may be many reasons for the paucity of research on status in economics.  One is the lack of 
convincing empirical evidence. Another is associated with technical difficulties. For example, equilibrium 
may  not  exist  in  many  models.  Another  is  the  implicit  “individualism”  assumption  in  neoclassical 
economics. (Kjosavik 2003).   3
  However,  hard  evidence  on  the  role  of  status,  especially  in  the  workplace,  is 
inconclusive if not scarce
3. A rigorous quantitative analysis of status must address three 
challenges.  First,  status  is  endogenously  determined  by  individuals’  unobserved 
characteristics, such as ability or ambition. To address this endogeneity problem, one 
must find an exogenous shock to status, that is, an event that affects the wages of a 
worker’s  colleagues,  but  not  the  wage  of  the  worker  him/herself.  Second,  we  have 
surprisingly  little  understanding  of  workers’  reference  groups,  i.e.  those  with  whom 
workers compare themselves. As a result, it is unclear whether to measure relative wages 
with respect to other workers in the same occupation, with all the workers in the same 
firm, with workers in other firms, etc. As we will demonstrate later, a misspecification of 
reference  group  can  bias  the  estimation  results,  and  their  resulting  theoretical 
interpretations. Third, it is difficult to conclude whether observed concerns about status 
are due to social preference as assumed in the theoretical literature or to other factors. For 
example, workers may care about their status because it is a signal of ability that affects 
their future market wages, not because they care about others’ wages or status per se.  
  Our empirical analysis of status attempts to address these three challenges and to 
add insights to the theoretical literature on status. The starting point of our analysis is the 
identification of exogenous changes in workers’ status within firms. Such changes can 
arise during M&As. In these cases, workers are introduced to a large pool of new co-
workers, and their status within occupation or firm may change significantly. Since an 
average worker cannot affect the M&A decision, the changes in status during M&As can 
be considered exogenous to any individual worker’s characteristics. Moreover, M&As 
change  workers’  status  only  within  the  firm’s  boundary.  In  other  words,  M&As  are 
                                                 
3 There are many cases studies especially in social psychology.  (see, e.g., Hogg and Terry 2001)   4
unlikely to change a worker’s status among friends, neighbors, or workers in other firms. 
Therefore,  we  can  focus  on  reference  groups  within  firms  without  worrying  about 
possible bias from omitting status in other reference groups. In particular, we focus on 
two natural reference groups within the firm: (i) workers in the same occupation group 
(e.g. marketing department) and (ii) all workers in the same firm. 
  We construct personnel data of merging firms for more than 400 M&As from the 
Swedish  employer-employee  matched  data,  which  present  unprecedented  scope  and 
detail. Our analysis shows that an increase in status with respect to co-workers in the 
same  occupation,  (henceforth status  within  occupation),  leads  to  lower  probability  of 
turnover, which suggests a preference for high status within occupation. The preference 
for a one standard deviation increase in status within occupation is equivalent to that for a 
6.8% increase in wages. Interestingly, however, holding status within occupation constant, 
an increase in status with respect to all the workers in the same firm, (henceforth status 
within firm),  leads  to  higher  turnover  rates,  which  suggests  preference  for  low  status 
within a firm. Although the latter result is somewhat counter-intuitive, as we discuss later, 
it is consistent with extant theories in the literature. These results show not only the 
importance and complexity of status concerns in the workplace, but also the significance 
of controlling for multiple reference groups. 
  We also show that an increase in status within occupation during M&A leads to 
lower wage growth rates after the M&A. This finding is important, as it suggests that 
high status is not instrumental for future pecuniary rewards, but that workers are willing 
to give up (or be less aggressive in pursuing) their pecuniary payoffs in exchange for   5
additional  social  rewards  from  increased  status
4.  It  also  suggests  the  existence  of  a 
‘market for status’ as theorized by Frank (1985) and Becker et al. (2005). 
  Previous empirical studies have largely ignored the endogeneity of status (e.g. 
Pritchard, Dunnette, and Jorgenson 1972, Valenzi and Andrews 1971, Clark and Oswald 
1996, Martin 2003, and Brown et. al. 2007)
5. While Luttmer (2005) attempts to control 
for individuals’ and reference groups’ unobserved characteristics using fixed effects, this 
method leaves insufficient variation in the data to give accurate estimates . Moreover, 
many of these studies analyze the effect of status on subjective satisfaction (happiness) 
ratings  (see  also  Layard  2005).  It  is  well  known,  however,  that  in  such  surveys  and 
experiments  people  often  report  relative  satisfaction  ratings  instead  of  absolute 
satisfaction  ratings,  which  potentially  undermines  the  purpose  of  these  studies.  (see 
Tversky and Griffin 1991 and Frederick and Loewenstein 1999)
6 Galizzi and Lang (1998) 
study how relative wages influence on turnover behavior, but likewise fail to control for 
unobserved individual characteristics
7.  
  It is worth emphasizing that all of these studies have chosen reference groups 
arbitrarily  (often  according  to  the  availability  of  data),  and  that  none  allows  for  the 
possibility of multiple reference groups
8. For example, Clark and Oswald (1996) measure 
relative wage with respect to a national survey, Luttmer (2005)  with respect to neighbors, 
                                                 
4 Zizzo and Oswald (2001) provides the related experimental evidence. 
5 A potential exception includes Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) which shows how  married  women’s 
labor market participation is affected by the wage of a sister-in-law. 
6 Also see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) on the problems of using self-reported measures of happiness. 
7 Experimental studies can control these issues directly. However, the limitation of lab experiments is the 
standard  one  of  external  validity.  Given  that  social  preference  arises  from  complex  social  interactions 
among  heterogeneous  agents,  it  is  difficult  to  recreate  such  social  interactions  in  a  lab.  See  Fehr  and 
Schmidt (2005) for a survey of experimental evidence. 
8 There is an old tradition in the theoretical literature in sociology distinguishing multiple reference groups. 
(see Merton 1949 and 1957, Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, and Cohen 1972,  and Jasso 1980).  In economics, 
Frank (1985), for instance, discusses various reference groups. However research on multiple reference 
groups is plagued by paucity of data and hence lacks empirical analysis.    6
and  Galizzi  and  Lang  (1998)  with  respect  to  all  workers  in  a  firm
9.  However,  it  is 
possible that people may care about their status with respect to co-workers in the same 
occupation, rather than to everyone in a firm, or that they may care about status with 
respect to friends, rather than to all neighbors, or to a whole country. Our results show 
that the misspecification of reference group can bias the results and that preference for 
status  in  one  reference  group  cannot  be  generalized  to  preference  for  status  in  other 
reference groups. 
  Most previous empirical studies have also focused on whether people care about 
their status, but not necessarily on why. For example, many studies simply assume that 
people  care  about  status  for  the  social  benefits they  derive  from  it,  such  as  prestige, 
respect,  or  perceived  fairness.  Other  studies  assume  that  the  observed  preference  for 
status is due to status’ instrumental value for future pecuniary benefits such as larger 
wages  or  faster  promotions
10 (e.g.  Galizzi  and  Lang  1998).  Aside  from  experimental 
evidence (e.g. Zizzo and Oswald 2001, Brown et. al. 2007), this paper is one of the few 
field studies that formally test the underlying preference for status
11. 
  The paper is organized  as follows.  In section  I, we summarize the theoretical 
literature on status. Section II describes our empirical methodology. We describe the data 
and the construction of variables in section III. In section IV, we examine how changes in 
status  in  different  reference  groups  affect  workers’  turnover  rates,  and  infer  their 
preference for status. Section V investigates whether the observed preference for status is 
due to (i) the instrumental value of status for pecuniary rewards or (ii) the social value of 
                                                 
9 Similarly, in theoretical models, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) takes workers in the same firm as a reference 
group, while Summers (1986) takes comparable workers in other firms as a reference group. 
10 For more detailed discussion of the distinction between social value and instrumental value, see Sobel 
(2005). 
11 Luttmer (2005) also provides suggestive evidence for the social value of status.   7
status as prestige and respect. We discuss further evidence in section VI, and conclude in 
section VII. 
 
I. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this section, we survey various theories in sociology and economics that address why 
and how workers may care about their status in the workplace. Note that throughout the 
paper,  we  refer  to  relative  wage  as  status  (specific  measures  of  relative  wage  are 
discussed later) without pre-imposing any social/economic value on status. We will also 
discuss an alternative measure of status based on job titles/ranks within a firm instead of 
on wages. 
 
A. Status and Social Rewards 
Concerns about status can arise if status enters directly into a person’s utility function, 
called social preference. For example, social preference can take the following form: 
 
   
  =  (  ,  )          (1) 
 
where    is  worker  ′  absolute  income,  and    =  (  ,  ,…,  ) is  worker  ′  status 
within a reference group of n workers. Note that    is a function of others’ incomes in the 
reference group
12. 
                                                 
12  Jasso  (2001)  discusses  how  the  different  sociological  theories  mentioned  above  imply  different 
functional  form  of  s(.).  However,  identifying  the  functional  form  of  s(.)  and  distinguishing  different 
theories within the sociology literature is outside the scope of this paper, and is pursued in a separate paper.   8
  Sociology  provides  various  theories  on  how  status  can  enter  into  a  social 
preference. In social status theory, status within a particular group can signify prestige, 
honor,  esteem,  or  respect.  (see,  e.g.,  Goode  1978,  Sorensen  1979,  Jasso  2001)  Here 
members of the group positively value their own status. In equity theory, lower status can 
represent an individual’s perceived inequity in terms of monetary compensation. Thus, 
holding  everything  else  constant,  a  lower  status  decreases  the  individual’s  utility.  In 
particular, when a person attempts to restore equity in other dimensions (e.g. by shirking), 
the individual’s perception of status affects his or her behavior and welfare. (Adams 1963, 
1965, see also Akerlof and Yellen 1990)   Similarly,  in  relative  deprivation  theory 
(Stouffer et al. 1949) or social exchange theory (Blau 1955, Homans 1961), the utility of 
an individual decreases when his or her status is lower than the status of comparable 
others.  Frank  (1985)  and  Fershtman  and  Weiss  (1998)  also  provide  evolutionary 
justification for such preferences
13.  
   
B. Status and Pecuniary Rewards 
In contrast to sociological theories, standard economics models have shown that concerns 
about status can be explained without relying on the concepts of social rewards or social 
preference. For example, people may positively value status because it serves as a signal 
of  the  worker’s  unobserved  quality,  especially  when  the  market  only  observes  the 
worker’s status, not the absolute wage. Then, a higher status can signal higher quality and 
lead  to  larger  future  income  (see,  e.g.,  Podolny  2005).  Also,  in  a  tournament  of 
promotions,  a  worker  may  positively  value  status  because  future  expected  payoffs 
increase  with  higher  status,  or  relative  ranking.  (e.g.,  Lazear  and  Rosen  1981) 
                                                 
13 See Akerlof and Yellen (1990) for a more detailed summary.   9
Consequently, a worker will positively value status not because of its own social rewards, 
but because of its instrumental value for his/her future pecuniary rewards. Weber (1922) 
also suggests that the value of status arises partly because high status provides access to 
better resources and opportunities.  




  =  (   ,     (   ))          (2) 
 
where t is a time index. Note that unlike the social preference in (1), if we hold all the 
pecuniary benefits (   ,     ) constant, utility does not depend on status. 
 
C. Preference for low status? 
It is interesting to note that both social reward theories and pecuniary reward theories 
predict that workers may prefer lower status in a particular reference group. In social 
status theory, a worker may prefer a lower status within a firm, holding everything else 
constant, in order to work with relatively higher-quality (and better-paid) co-workers who 
can raise the status of the firm. For example, an economics job candidate may prefer a 
top-ranked department for its department prestige, even though his/her status within the 
top-ranked department may be quite low. This idea is captured by the concept of the 
‘status group’ in Weber (1922) or the ‘halo effect’ in Frank (1985)
14 . Similarly, in equity 
theory and relative deprivation theory, when workers interact with people outside the 
                                                 
14 See also Ridgeway (1991) and Jasso (2001). Formally, we can specify a reduced-form utility function as 
   
  =  (  ,  ,  (  )) where   is the status of the firm in the economy and   
  < 0.   10
firm, they may care about equity or fairness in terms of their firm’s relative standing with 
respect to other firms. 
  People  may  also  negatively  value  their  status  because  high  status  can  lead  to 
lower future income, i.e.,      
  (   ) < 0 in (2). For example, high status could mean that 
there is no more opportunity for future promotions or wage increases (the dead-end effect; 
see  Galizzi  and  Lang  1998).  Then,  workers,  holding  everything  else  constant,  would 
prefer lower status. Moreover, the economics job candidate mentioned above may prefer 
a top-ranked department because he or she can learn from higher quality (i.e. better paid) 
co-workers. (the learning effect; see Frank 1985) Finally, in the context of M&As, if the 
average wage of workers in the acquiring firm is higher than that in the acquired firm, the 
workers  in  the  acquiring  firm  may  be  afraid  that  their  wages  will  be  reduced  after 
M&A(wage  compression  effect)
15,  even  though  their  status  within  the  firm  would 
increase.  
  We can summarize these theories of status as follows:  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
II. Empirical Strategy 
 
To investigate whether and how workers value their status, we study changes in workers’ 
status during M&A and workers’ subsequent turnover behaviors.  
 
                                                 
15 For example, American Airlines pilots opposed the merger with Reno Airlines partly because they were 
afraid that their wages would not increase much and that their jobs would be replaced by cheaper Reno 
pilots. (Cimini 1999)   11
A. M&A as a !atural Experiment 
Three key features of M&As make them attractive natural experiments. First, in 
typical panel data, a worker’s status changes over time mostly because his or her absolute 
income changes. Therefore, if one controls for absolute income and other unobserved 
individual characteristics, there is insufficient variations in the status of an individual to 
identify the effect of status. (see e.g. Luttmer (2005) Table II) However, during an M&A, 
a large pool of new co-workers is introduced to the merged firm. A worker’s status within 
the firm may change significantly even if nothing about the worker him- or herself, such 
as absolute income, has changed. This makes it possible to identify the effect of status on 
workers’ behavior.  
  Second,  changes  in  status  during  M&As  are  for  the  most  part  exogenous  to 
individual  workers’  (unobserved)  characteristics,  because  an  individual  worker  is 
unlikely to influence merger and acquisition decisions. This contrasts with the typical 
situation, in which a worker’s status within a firm and/or an occupation is endogenously 
determined by the worker’s ability and ambition, the worker’s choice of a firm, and the 
firm’s promotion and wage policies. These factors have made it difficult to find a natural 
experiment  that  can  affect  a  worker’s  status  without  influencing  the  worker’s  other 
characteristics, but they are addressed by the special cases of M&As. 
  The third feature of M&As are their influence on a worker’s status solely within 
the firm boundary. For example, a worker’s status within a specific department or within 
the  whole  firm  will  change,  but  the  worker’s  status  among  neighbors  or  friends  is 
unlikely to change due to an M&A. Therefore, we can focus on reference groups within 
the firm, ignoring other reference groups outside the firm.   12
  A potential shortcoming of this approach is that M&As change various aspects of 
a company, other than the workers’ status. If changes in status are correlated with other 
changes in, for example, productivity or organizational structure, the measured effect of 
status may reflect the effect of other (unobserved) structural changes. To address this 
concern, we construct various distance measures that capture the differences between 
merging firms in terms of structures of wage, occupation, industry, geography, gender, 
and rank. Assuming that most structural changes during and after M&A depend on the 
pre-existing difference between the two companies, these distance variables can control 
for potential structural changes during M&As.  
 
B. Revealed Preference for Status 
In  this  paper,  we  infer  workers’  preference  for  status  from  their  observed  turnover 
behaviors. If workers prefer higher (lower) status, an exogenous increase in status should 
lead to higher (lower) utility and lower (higher) probability of quitting. This approach has 
two  salient  merits.  First,  as  discussed  above,  we  avoid  using  potentially  problematic 
“happiness ratings” from self-reported surveys. Second, no assumptions are needed about 
how status should change the marginal utility of income/consumption. Many models of 
status derive their predictions by assuming that status increases the marginal utility of 
income  (e.g.  Becker  et  al.  2005).  However,  sociological  theories  of  status  do  not 
necessarily support this assumption. 
  Unfortunately,  as  with  other  studies  on  turnovers,  it  is  difficult  to  distinguish 
directly  between  quits  and  layoffs.  However,  unlike  most  such  studies,  we  can  track 
workers’ wages after they have left a firm. Therefore, if workers’ wages drop after they   13
leave a firm (or increase less than the wages of those who remain), we can define such 
instances of turnover as ‘layoffs’, and exclude  them from the  analysis. Alternatively, 
following previous studies (e.g. Jacobson, et. al.1993 and Galizzi and Lang 1998), we can 
define  instances  of  turnover  as  ‘layoffs’  and  drop  them  if  the  combined  size  of  the 
merged firms decreases significantly. 
  
C. Social vs. Pecuniary Preference 
Even if workers prefer high (or low) status, as shown in Table 1, this does not necessarily 
imply that they prefer high/low status for social preference reasons. To investigate the 
underlying preference, we examine how exogenous changes in status affect wage growth 
rates  after  an  M&A.  Suppose  that  status  has  positive  social  value,  independent  of 
pecuniary  benefits.  If  a  worker’s  status  decreases  exogenously,  the  firm  should 
compensate the worker with more pecuniary benefits, (i.e. higher wages), in order to keep 
him or her from quitting. Alternatively, if his or her status increases, a worker would be 
willing to accept slower wage growth.  
Suppose,  however,  that  status  lacks  social  value,  and  has  solely  a  positive 
instrumental/pecuniary  value  for  his/her  future  wages.  If  a  worker’s  status  increases 
exogenously,  then  his/her  future  wages  should  increase.  Obviously,  if  status  has  a 
negative social or instrumental value, wages should move in the opposite direction. Then, 
combining  these  considerations  with  our  discussion  of  turnover,  we  can  distinguish 
different sets of theories as follows: 
 
[Table 2 here]   14
 
  An  important  caveat  in  the  study  of  wage  growth,  however,  is  that  we  only 
observe wage growth for those who remain after M&As. This can lead to a potential 
selection bias. In addition, an individual’s wage growth after an M&A may depend on 
other concurrent structural changes in productivity and organization. To address these 
issues, we use a Heckman two-step estimation to address potential selection bias, and we 
control for the pre-existing difference between two merging firms to capture potential 
structural changes after an M&A. 
 
III. Data and Measurement 
 
A. Swedish Employer-Employee Matched Data 
We construct personnel records of merging firms from the Swedish employer-employee 
matched data. The Swedish data are essentially the collection of personnel records of 
white-collar workers in all the firms in the private sector of Sweden from 1970 to 1990 
(except banking and insurance)
16.  The data served as the input to Sweden’s centralized 
wage negotiations and were gathered from personnel records by The Swedish Federation 
of Employers and monitored by the labor unions. Thus, the data are of very high quality. 
(see  Kwon  and  Myersson  Milgrom  (2008)  for  more  details  on  the  wage  negotiation 
system in Sweden.) 
For  each  worker,  the  data  contain  annual  information  on  wage,  age,  gender, 
education, geographic region, firm ID, plant ID, industry ID, occupation ID, and rank. 
Because all the IDs are comparable across firms, occupations, and time, we can track 
                                                 
16 The data also excludes the executive team (e.g. CEO or CFO).   15
each individual worker across firms and occupations throughout his/her career. The data 
lack information about firm tenure. However, due to the long and expansive span of the 
data, we can compute firm tenure for those workers who entered the data (or the labor 
market) after 1970. 
The occupation code (called BNT code) is a four-digit code, where the first three 
digits (occupation ID) describe types of tasks. The fourth digit (rank ID) describes the 
degree of skill needed to fulfill the tasks as well as the number of subordinates. The 
white-collar  workers’  occupations  cover  51  three-digit  occupation  groups  such  as 
construction, design, and management. (for more details, see appendix A). Within each 
occupation, the fourth digit rank code runs from 1 (lowest) to 7 (highest). 
  In this study, we focus on firms involved in acquisitions. Our data do not include 
information  about  firm  ownership  other  than  firm  ID.  Therefore,  we  identify  M&As 
based on changes in workers’ firm IDs. More specifically, if more than 50% of workers 
in one firm change firm ID
17, say from A to B,  and if the old firm ID, A, disappears from 
the  data,  then  we  say  “B  has  acquired  A”.  We  refer to  B  as  ‘acquirer’  and  to  A  as 
‘acquired’. We restrict our attention to firms with more than ten white-collar workers
18. 
There are only a few clearly identified merger cases where more than 50% of workers 
from both firm A and B move to a new firm C, and where firm A and B disappear. 
Therefore, we focus on clearly identified acquisition cases only. 
                                                 
17 Even when we require more than 90% of workers to change firm ID, there is very little change in our 
results. 
18 Focusing on firms with more than 100 white-collar workers does not change the qualitative results of the 
paper.   16
  This sample contains 443 M&A cases and 186,679 workers
19. Figure 1 shows these 
numbers by year.  
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Given that previous studies of M&A are based on personnel records from one or two 
firms or on simple surveys of workers, our data provide unprecedented scope and detail.  
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of selected variables. Acquiring firms are, 
on  average,  much  larger  than  acquired  firms
20.  When  we  measure  firm  size  by  the 
number of (white-collar) workers, the average ratio of acquired to acquiring firm size is 
0.61, but there are large variations. At the individual level, acquiring firms and acquired 
firms  are  comparable  in  workers’  average  age,  rank,  male-female  ratio,  and  wage. 
Though the average rank and wage are slightly higher in acquiring firms, this effect can 
largely be explained by the differences in firm size. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
  At the worker level, workers in acquired firms have, on average, higher turnover 
rates after M&A than those in acquiring firms. Average turnover rates in the first year 
after an M&A (turnover1) are 12.1% for acquiring firms and 15.5% for acquired firms. In 
comparison, the average turnover rate in Swedish firms is about 10% per year. Within 
                                                 
19 Some firms are involved in more than one M&A during our sample period. Excluding M&A where the 
same firm is involved in more than one M&A within 6 years does not change our qualitative results.  
20 In our sample, the number of workers from acquired firms is much smaller than the firm size ratio would 
suggest. This is because we have excluded workers if the number of co-workers in the same occupation in 
the same firm is less than 10, which applies to many workers in acquired firms due to their smaller size. 
Recall, however, that focusing solely on larger firms does not change our qualitative results.   17
three years, the turnover rate (turnover3) is 32.6% for acquiring firms and 39.2% for 
acquired firms. 
 
B. Reference Groups 
We  measure  status  with  respect  to  two  reference  groups:  (i)  co-workers  in  the  same 
occupation in the same firm and (ii) all the workers in the same firm. Workers are likely 
to compete with other workers in the same occupation for promotions, and therefore to 
compare themselves with one another. Consequently, the occupation group is a likely 
candidate for a significant reference group. Moreover, from the perspective of pecuniary 
rewards theory, co-workers in the same occupation are subject to the same information 
and wage dynamics (such as signaling, and tournaments), and thus constitute a natural 
reference group. 
  All workers in the same firm, regardless of occupation, constitute another likely 
reference group, as they all share a common employer and personnel policy.  In fact, 
many previous studies have focused on relative wages within a single firm only. (see, e.g., 
Telly, French, and Scott 1971, Dittrich and Carrel 1979, Galizzi and Lang 1998.)  
  These  two  reference  groups  are  also  interesting  because  workers  in  the  same 
occupation  are  typically  substitutable  as  they  possess  the  same  types  of  skills,  while 
workers  in  different  occupations  are  likely  to  be  complementary.  Therefore,  we  can 
potentially study how such differences in the social/production context can interact with 
status. 
  Note  that  instead  of  making  an  ad-hoc  assumption  that  one  reference  group 
matters more than another, we control for status in both reference groups and then let the   18
data speak for themselves.  Of course, it remains impossible to control for status in all 
possible reference groups: for example, in this study, we ignore other potential reference 
groups, such as, the same gender group, the same-hiring-year cohort, workers with the 
same rank, etc. We pursue the study of these reference groups in separate papers. 
 
C. Status 
We  measure  status  by  relative  wage.  One  possible  measure  of  relative  wage  is  the 
deviation from the mean, i.e.,    −   where   is the average wage in a reference group. 
Other  possible  measures  include  the  relative  ranking  of  wage,  or  the  value  of  the 
cumulative density function (CDF) of wage, where 0 is the lowest and 1 is the highest. In 
this paper, following the tradition of sociological theory (see e.g. Sørensen 1979 and 
Jasso 2001), we define status as follows:  
 






















  (3) 
 
where ! denotes the number of workers in the group, n denotes the raw rank (with 1 
assigned to the lowest wage and ! assigned to the largest wage), and r (0 ≤ r ≤1) denotes 
the relative rank of wage (= n/!).   
  This  formula  captures  two  aspects  of  social  status.  First,  because  the  status 
measure in (3) is a convex function of relative ranking of wages (r), the ranking matters 
for status more at the top than at the bottom. For example, the change in status when the 
second-highest  ranked  person  becomes  the  highest  ranked  person  is  greater  than  the   19
change  in  status  when  the  lowest  ranked  person  becomes  the  second-lowest  ranked 
person. Second, a high relative ranking in a large group is assigned with  a higher status 
than  the  same  relative  ranking  in  a  smaller  group.  For  example,  for  the  highest-paid 
person, the status is ln((!+1)/(!+1-!))=ln(!+1) which increases with N (for more detail, 
see Jasso 2001). 
  Status can be measured not only by relative wages, but also by relative position in 
a hierarchical structure. A unique aspect of the Swedish data is that they contain seven 
hierarchical rank codes (the fourth digit of the BNT code) within each occupation (the 
first three digits). Therefore, we can measure each worker’s relative position in his or her 
occupation by the number of workers below that worker’s  rank, divided by the total 
number of workers in the occupation. 
We do not analyze which measure is most relevant. Instead, we show that our 
main results are robust according to each of these various measures of status
21. 
 
D. Expected Change in Status 
As discussed above, our identification is based on changes in status during M&As. Figure 
2 shows that M&As bring significant changes in status.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Because  acquired  firms  tend  to  be  much  smaller  than  acquiring  firms,  workers  in 
acquired firms experience larger average changes in status. Specifically, for an average 
                                                 
21 For more details on different measures of status and underlying theories in psychology, see Brown et. al. 
(2007).   20
worker in an acquiring firm, an M&A causes a 2% change in status within firm and a 3% 
change in status within occupation. However, for an average worker in an acquired firm, 
an M&A causes 14% and 20% changes in status within firm and within occupation, 
respectively. Figure 2 shows that these changes are almost twice the usual changes in 
status in the absence of an M&A. 
  Despite large changes in status during M&As, using actual changes in status has 
several potential problems. First, as Figure 2 shows, status can change even without an 
M&A, for example, due to change in one’s own absolute income. Second, for those who 
quit during an M&A, we don’t observe their change in status. Therefore, using actual 
changes for those who remain after an M&A is subject to a potential selection bias. Third, 
actual change in status can be correlated with other unexpected structural changes during 
an M&A.  
  Therefore, we focus on expected post-merger status as measured by status with 
respect to all the workers in two merging companies combined, just before the merger. 
We also define expected change in status by the difference between expected post-merger 
status and actual pre-merger status. Table 4 provides examples showing how we compute 
expected post-merger relative wages and status. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Since we do not use actual post-merger wages in constructing these variables, expected 
change in status is due entirely to changes in firm boundary, and not to wage change or to 
any structural changes during an M&A. Also, since we can measure expected changes in   21
status  for  everyone  before  the  M&A,  the  potential  selection  bias  problem  can  be 
eliminated. 
  Thus, controlling for pre-merger status and absolute income, we will primarily 
focus on how expected changes in status (or equivalently expected post-merger status) 
affect workers’ turnover rate and wage growth after M&As. Alternatively, we will use 
expected change in status as an instrument for actual change in status. Table 5 shows 
basic summary statistics for status variables. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Note that the correlation between expected changes in status within firm, denoted by 
  Δ      _     ,  and  expected  changes  in  status  within  occupation,  denoted  by 
  Δ      _       is 0.53. Thus, if status in both reference groups matters, omitting one 
status can lead to a potentially significant omitted-variable bias. 
 
IV. Revealed Preference for Status and Reference Group 
 
A. Expected Change in Status and Turnover 
In  this  section,  we  infer  workers’  preference  for  status  from  their  observed  turnover 
behavior.  In particular,  we are interested in the effects of  expected changes in status 
within  occupation  (  Δ      _      ) and  expected  changes  in  status  within  firm 
(  Δ      _     ). More specifically, we estimate the following probit regression.  
   22
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where  ijt T = 1 if worker i from firm j quits within two years
22 after the M&A at year t, and 
= 0 otherwise. Acquiredjt is a dummy variable for workers from acquired firms. Xijt-1 is a 
vector of individual characteristics at year t-1 that includes age, age squared, a set of 
dummy variables for gender, part time, rank, occupation, and region
23.  Zjt is a vector of 
firm characteristics that include post-merger (combined) firm size, ratio of before-and-
after-merger firm sizes, the ratio of before-and-after-merger occupation sizes, ratio of 
workers who move to other plants in different regional codes during an M&A, wage 
dispersion
24, actual changes in wage dispersion after the M&A, and industry dummy 
variables.  t d is a time dummy variable for the  year of the M&A. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering within each M&A case.  
  Since it is generally very difficult for firms to fire workers in Sweden, at first we 
treat all instances of turnover as quits. Later, we attempt to distinguish quits and layoffs 
and show that most results remain robust. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
In Table 6 column [1], we control only for status within the firm and its expected change, 
and find that the expected change in status within a firm has a significant positive effect 
                                                 
22 We focus on instances of turnovers within two years after the M&A. However, even when we study only 
the turnover immediately after the M&A, the qualitative results do not change.  
23 Education is  not controlled for because data are  missing for  many  workers especially in the 1970s. 
Controlling for education for M&A in the 1980s, however, does not change the results. 
24 Wage dispersion is measured by standard deviation of wages within each firm.   23
on worker turnover. However, Table 6 column [2] shows that the expected change in 
status within an occupation has a significant negative effect on turnover probability. In 
Table 6 column [3], we control for both the expected changes in status within a firm and 
within an occupation. Under these controls, the size of the coefficients nearly doubles for 
expected changes in status both within firm and within occupation. 
  This analysis yields at least three noteworthy findings. First, an expected increase 
in status within an occupation (E[∆status_occup]) decreases the turnover probability. The 
estimates from column [3] indicate that a one standard deviation increase in status within 
occupation  reduces  turnover  probability  by  12.1%.    This  finding  suggests  that  status 
within occupation strictly increases workers’ utility. 
  Second,  somewhat  surprisingly,  an  expected  increase  in  status  within  a  firm 
(E[∆status_firm]),  holding  status  within  occupation  constant,  increases  turnover 
probability. From column [3], for an average worker, a one standard deviation increase in 
status within firm raises turnover probability by 18.2%. This finding suggests that status 
within firm strictly decreases workers’ utility. Though this finding may seem counter-
intuitive, it is, as discussed in Table 1, consistent with group status theory or the dead-end 
story. 
  Third,  distinguishing  two  reference  groups  (occupation  and  firm)  is  very 
important. Controlling for status in only one reference group biases the effect of status 
toward zero, reducing the size of the coefficients almost by a half. Such omitted variable 
biases may explain why Telly, French, and Scott (1971) and Dittrich and Carrell (1979) 
find  that  relative  wage  within  firm  does  not  provide  a  significant  explanation  for   24
turnovers. More importantly, controlling for status only within firm caused the analysis to 
miss the significant and opposite effect of status within occupation. 
  We also find that workers who already had high status within occupation are less 
likely to quit. Since workers with high relative wages are those who have long tenure and 
high ranks, they have low turnover rates as previous studies have shown. (e.g. Farber 
1994) Interestingly, holding status within occupation constant, workers who already had 
high status within a firm are more likely to quit. A potential explanation is that these 
workers have reached the end of the career ladder within the firm and thus are more 
likely to quit.  
  It is also interesting to note that an increase in wage dispersion raises workers’ 
turnover rates. This could be either because workers have preference for wage quality or 
because an increase in wage dispersion implies an incompatibility of wage structure.  
 
B. Actual Change in Status and Turnover 
In the previous section, we implicitly assumed that workers make their turnover decisions 
based on their expected changes in status before the actual merger takes place. However, 
workers may not correctly predict the change in status or they may decide whether to quit 
after observing actual changes in status and wages. Thus, in Table 7, we estimate the 
effect of actual changes in wages as well as the effect of actual changes in status both 
within occupation and within firm. In all other respects, the specification of regression is 
the same as in Table 6. 
 
[Table 7 here]   25
 
  However, those who quit during the M&A process are omitted because we don’t 
observe actual changes in status and wages for them. Thus, in Table 7 column [1], we 
control for the potential selection bias using the Heckman two-step procedure. The first-
stage selection regression includes all the same control variables except that expected 
changes in status are used instead of actual changes in status. Note that the qualitative 
results do not change from Table 6, column [3]. 
  Furthermore,  using  these  estimates,  we  can  value  a  one  standard  deviation 
increase in status within occupation as being equivalent to an increase in monthly wage 
of 215.14 Kronor, or 6.8%. Also, a one standard deviation increase in status within firm 
is equivalent to a decrease in monthly wage by 504.96 Kronor, or 15.9%.  
  In  column  [2],  we  again  control  for  both  actual  changes  in  wages  and  actual 
changes in status. However, instead of using a Heckman 2-step estimation, we use the 
expected changes in status as instrumental variables for actual changes in status. Note 
that  unlike  the  Heckman  2-step  procedure,  this  approach  does  not  require  any 
distributional assumptions. Column [2] shows that the instrumental variable approach 
yields the same qualitative results. 
 
C. Robustness 
In  this  section,  we  assess  the  robustness  of  our  results  with  respect  to  alternative 
measures and specifications. 
 
■ Quits vs. Layoffs   26
An alternative explanation for our findings is that workers are fired in a systematic way 
during M&As. For example, workers with high expected post-merger status within firms 
may be more likely to be fired during an M&A, perhaps because they become redundant. 
On the other hand, workers with high expected post-merger status within occupations 
may be less likely to be fired, perhaps because they are highly skilled. In this case, our 
estimates would be capturing these structural changes in worker composition rather than 
changes in status per se. 
  To control for this possibility, we repeat our analysis after excluding layoffs or 
involuntary turnovers. First, following previous studies (e.g. Jacobson, et. al.1993 and 
Galizzi and Lang 1998), we define an instance of turnover as involuntary and exclude it if 
the (combined) size of the merged firm decreases by more than 10%. Table 8 column [1] 
shows that the qualitative results do not change. 
Second, unlike most previous studies, we can observe a worker’s wages in a new 
firm after he or she has quit the merged firm. Thus, we define an instance of turnover as 
involuntary  and  exclude  it  if  the  real  wage  falls.  Table  8  column  [2]  shows  that  the 
qualitative results still do not change. 
Finally, in column [3], we define turnovers as involuntary if the real wage growth 
after  turnover  is  smaller  than  the  average  growth  rate  of  remaining  workers  in  the 
previous firm. The qualitative results remain the same, but the expected change in status 
within firm becomes insignificant. One possible reason for this change is that too many 
instances of turnover are classified as involuntary and excluded, since more than 44% of 
the instances of turnover are classified as involuntary under this definition. Given the   27
general difficulty of firing workers in Sweden, this definition seems to overestimate the 
amount of involuntary turnover. 
   
[Table 8 here] 
 
  As  in  most  studies  on  turnover,  it  is  impossible  to  make  a  clear  distinction 
between layoffs and quits. However, the fact that our results are largely robust under 
various definition of quits suggests that our findings are not driven by involuntary layoffs, 
specifically those due to structural changes during an M&A.  
 
■ Alternative Measures of Status 
So far, we have measured workers’ status within a reference group by relative wage as in 
equation (3), in the manner stipulated by Jasso (2001), building on the work of Goode 
(1978) and Sorensen (1979). However, relative wage can be measured in various ways. 
First, we measure status by the relative ranking itself (= n/! according to the notation in 
equation (3)), where 0 is the lowest and 1 the highest. Table 9, column [1] shows that the 
qualitative results do not change.  
We can also measure status by the deviation of wages from the mean, (   −  ). 
Table 9, column [2] shows that expected changes in status within occupation still have 
significant negative effects on turnover. However, it is unclear why expected changes in 
status within firm are no longer significant. Workers may not care about status within 
firm after all. Alternatively, the deviation of wages from the mean may not be a correct   28
measure of status within firm. For example, Brown et. al. (2007) suggest that ranking is a 
more relevant measure of status based on both experimental and field evidence. 
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
Another explanation may be that workers care more about their relative position 
in the authority hierarchy of a firm than about their relative wage. Thus, in column [3] we 
measure status by a worker’s relative standing within the rank hierarchy of his or her 
occupation without using wage information. Recall that one of the unique features of the 
Swedish data is that they contain accurate information on rank within each occupation, 
ranging from 1 (lowest) to 7 (highest). The ranks are determined based on required skill 
levels  and  responsibility,  and  are  comparable  across  firms.  However,  ranks  across 
different  occupations  are  not  precisely  comparable.  In  other  words,  it  is  difficult  to 
construct the hierarchy structure within a firm across different occupations. Therefore, we 
focus on workers’ status within their own occupation hierarchy. More specifically, we 
use the following alternative measure of status: 
 
occupation   e  within th  workers of number    total
occupation   n the rank withi own    s one'   below    workers of   #
    _occup status =
H     (5) 
 
The  expected  post-merger  status  is  computed  in  the  same  way  as  before,  using  the 
workers’ occupation ranks in both firms A and B combined. 
  This measure of status  has two merits.  First, since individual wages, or wage 
distribution within a reference group, may not be observable, workers may not know their   29
relative standing in wages. However, ranks, or job titles, are easily observable. Second, 
while  wages  in  Sweden  are  largely  determined  by  centralized  wage  bargaining, 
promotions are entirely up to each firm’s discretion. Thus, measuring status by relative 
ranks can avoid reflecting the potential effects of the centralized wage bargaining system. 
  Table 9 column [3] shows that the qualitative results are robust even when status 
is measured by relative standing in ranks. Therefore, the negative effect of status within 
occupation on turnover rate is robust under various measures of status. However, the 
positive effect of status within firm is not always robust, and requires more caution in its 
interpretation. 
 
■ Rational Expectations 
When we compute expected change in status as in Table 4, an implicit assumption is that 
workers expect all those working prior to the M&A to stay after the M&A or that workers 
will leave firms randomly, independent of changes in status. However, rational workers 
will understand workers’ turnover patterns as illustrated in Table 6. These workers can 
predict their expected change in status based on rational expectations of who will leave 
and who will stay. 
  Thus,  we  re-compute  the  (rational)  expected  change  in  status  assuming  that 
workers can correctly predict who will leave and who will stay after the M&A. For each 
worker who actually leaves the firm, we compute his or her expected change in status 
based on the worker’s expected post-merger status if he or she had stayed, assuming all 
the others would not change their turnover decisions
25.  
                                                 
25 Workers’ (rational) expected post-merger status can be different from actual post-merger status for two 
reasons. First, the expected post-merger status is computed based on the rankings of wages before the   30
  Table 9 column [4] shows that there are no changes in the qualitative results when 
we use rational expectations. 
 
■ Hypothetical M&A 
If two firms are not merging, then workers have little reason to care about their status 
compared to workers in other firms. Therefore, as a specification test, we repeat the same 
analysis as in Table 6 for hypothetical M&As that have not actually happened.  
  More  specifically,  to  control  for  unobserved  firm  characteristics,  we  focus  on 
each pair of firms involved in an actual M&A, and look at their data five years before the 
actual M&A. Because workers could not have anticipated an M&A with a specific firm 
five years later, they would not have cared about status compared with workers in the 
other firm. In Table 10 column [1], we repeat the same analysis as in Table 6 column [3], 
but  for  hypothetical  M&As  five  years  before  each  actual  M&A.  According  to  our 
specifications and interpretation, the expected changes in status should not be significant, 
within either occupation or firm, in these hypothetical M&As. Indeed, Table 10 column 
[1] shows that the expected (hypothetical) changes in status are not significant either 
within occupation or within firm.  
 
[Table 10 here] 
 
■ Controlling for Tenure 
                                                                                                                                                 
merger, not the actual post-merger wages. Second, workers newly hired during mergers are not accounted 
for.    31
It is well-known that firm tenure has a significant effect on turnover decisions (see, e.g., 
Farber  1999).  Unfortunately,  the  Swedish  data  do  not  contain  tenure  information. 
However, given the long span of the data, we can determine workers’ tenure if they enter 
a firm after 1970. In particular, for over 85% of workers between 1986 and 1988, we can 
observe their tenures in this manner. Thus, we repeat our analysis of firm turnovers using 
the sub-sample of M&As occurring between 1986 and 1988, adding tenure and tenure-
squared as control variables.  
Furthermore, since the centralized wage bargaining system in Sweden started to 
break down after 1983, use of this sub-sample is also a test of whether the centralized 
wage bargaining system in the 1970s had any effect on our qualitative results. 
Table 10 column [2] shows that controlling for tenure using this sub-sample does 
not change the qualitative results, suggesting that the lack of control for tenure or the 
centralized wage bargaining system in the 1970s is not responsible for our results. 
 
■ Unobserved Structural Changes 
M&As can change various aspects of firms including job assignment and wage policy. If 
changes in status are correlated with these unobserved structural changes during M&A, 
our  estimates  may  be  biased.  To  control  for  these  structural  changes,  we  construct  a 
distance measure between two firms in terms of various properties of the firms. We make 
the assumption that structural changes during and after the M&A are largely determined 
by  the  way  two  firms  differ  before  the  M&A,  and  consequently  that  controlling  for 
distance  measures  between  the  two  firms  should  capture  some  of  the  unobserved 
structural changes occurring with an M&A.   32
The  distance  between  two  firms  is  measured  by  subtracting  the  uncentered 
correlation from one, as proposed by Jaffe (1986). For example, to measure the distance 
in occupation structure, we construct a vector of occupation shares for an acquired firm, 
fi=(s1i,, s2i, …, s54i) where ski is occupation k’s share in firm i (in terms of number of 
workers)
26. We construct the same vector for its acquiring firm j, fj. Then, the distance in 
occupation structure is measured by 1 −
     
 
(      




 . This distance measure is zero if 
the composition of occupation is the same between the two firms, and is one if two firms 
do not share any occupation. 
Table 10, column [3] shows that controlling for distance measures in occupation, 
education, county, gender, age, and rank does not change the qualitative results on status 
variables.  As  we  show  in  another  paper,  however,  all  of  these  distance  measures 
significantly  affect  worker  turnover  rates.  In  particular,  difference  in  occupation  and 
gender  compositions  between  firms  reduces  turnover  rates,  suggesting  that  different 
occupations  and  genders  are  complementary  in  an  M&A.  However,  difference  in 
education, county, age, and rank compositions increases turnover rates, suggesting that, 
for example, workers with different education levels are substitutable.  
 
V. Preference for Status: Social Rewards vs. Pecuniary Rewards 
 
The previous section shows that workers value status within occupation positively, but 
surprisingly, may value status within firm negatively. As we discussed and summarized 
                                                 
26 We used 54 different occupations, 44 different industries, 24 different counties, 9 different education 
codes, 6 different age groups (11-20, 21-30, etc.), 7 rank codes, 2 gender codes, and 2 part time codes.   33
in  Table  2,  studying  the  wage  growth  rates  after  M&A  can  potentially  distinguish 
whether the value of status comes from its social value (such as prestige, equity, etc.) or 
from its instrumental/pecuniary value for future monetary benefits (through signaling, 
wage compression, etc.). 
  More specifically, we estimate the following wage regression: 
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where  WageGijt  is  the  average  annual  wage  growth  rate  over  the  period  from  a  year 
before the M&A to two years after it. Acquiredjt =1 if firm j is the acquired company, and 
= 0 otherwise. Xijt-1 is a vector of individual characteristics at year t-1 that includes age, 
age squared, a set of dummy variables for gender, part time,  occupation, and  region.  Zjt 
is a vector of firm characteristics, including before-merger firm size and industry dummy 
variables.  t d is a time dummy variable for the year of the M&A.  
 
[Table 11 here] 
 
Table 11 column [1] shows that when a worker’s status within occupation increases, the 
worker’s  wage  growth  rate  decreases.  However,  when  a  worker’s  status  within  firm 
increases, the worker’s wage growth rate increases. For example, for an average worker,  
a one standard deviation increase in status within occupation reduces annual wage growth   34
rate from 6.37% to 4.6%. However, a one standard deviation increase in status within 
firm raises annual wage growth rate from 6.37% to 10.62%. 
  This  finding  suggests  that  status  within  occupation  provides  positive  utility 
independent of pecuniary benefits. Therefore, those workers whose status has decreased 
exogenously during an M&A are being compensated by faster wage growth rates. If the 
value of status within occupation stems from its pecuniary benefits, lower status should 
have decreased wage growth rates.  
Similarly, this finding suggests that status within firm provides negative utility 
independent  of  pecuniary  benefits.  This  may  be  because  a  worker’s  status  rises 
exogenously during an M&A only if the average level of workers in the other firm is 
lower than his or hers. Thus, the negative utility provided by higher status within firm is 
due  to  the  reduced  status  of  the  firm  in  the  economy.  Therefore,  those  whose  status 
within firm has increased exogenously during M&A are being compensated by faster 
wage growth rates. 
  In column [2], we also estimate the Heckman two-step regression. Since the wage 
growth rate is observable only for those who didn’t quit within two years after an M&A, 
there  are  potential  concerns  about  selection  bias.  Thus,  we  first  estimate  a  selection 
equation that includes additional control variables such as the ratio of regional change, 
the ratio of firm size change, and the ratio of occupation size change. We then correct for 
the selection bias. Column [2] shows, however, no qualitative changes in the results.  
These findings are important for several reasons. First, to our knowledge, this is 
the first empirical evidence to show that workers’ preference for status vary with their 
reference  groups  or  social  contexts.  In  comparison  with  co-workers  in  the  same   35
occupation where skills are substitutable, workers positively value their individual status 
within the group for its social rewards, such as prestige, respect, or equity. However, 
holding  status  within  occupation  constant,  in  comparison  with  workers  in  other 
occupations in the same firm where skills are likely to be complementary, workers do not 
care about their individual status within the firm. Instead, they seem to care more about 
the status of the firm as a whole with respect to other firms. 
  Second,  this  is  one  of  the  first  papers  based  on  large  field  data  that  formally 
attempts to distinguish between the social and the pecuniary rewards of status
28. Even 
though experimental studies have explicitly controlled to eliminate the pecuniary aspects 
of status, it has been largely unknown whether the observed preference for status in the 
actual workplace is driven by its social rewards, or by pecuniary benefits.  
  Third, our findings suggest the possible existence of a market for status, where 
workers with different tastes for status can trade their status for larger absolute wages. 
Though we don’t directly observe such trades among workers, their willingness to pay for 
higher status strongly suggests the possibility of such a market. These findings provide 
empirical support for the existence of a market for status as theorized by Frank (1985) or 
Becker et al. (2005).
29 
  As  before,  one  caveat  for  our  interpretation  is  that  M&As  may  change  wage 
policies  and  affect  wage  growth  rates.  If  such  a  structural  change  is  correlated  with 
                                                 
28 Luttmer  (2005)  provides  suggestive  evidence  for  the  social  rewards  explanation  by  showing  that 
neighbors’ income matters more for socially active people. However, he does not formally distinguish 
between the pecuniary and social rewards explanations. 
29 Furthermore, these results suggest that it is possible to trade high status within occupation with low status 
within firm, or vice versa. For example, a worker would be willing to work with lower-quality co-workers 
within the company as long as s/he is the highest paid person in his/her occupation. Such a trade can ease 
conflicts within the firm and help integration of companies after M&As. We pursue a detailed analysis of 
this type of trade and its implication for conflicts and post-merger integration in another paper. 
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changes  in  status,  our  estimates  may  be  biased.  Thus,  we  again  control  for  various 
distance  measures  between  two  merging  firms  as  a  proxy  for  unobserved  structural 
changes. However, table 11, column [3] shows little change.  
 
VI. Discussions 
A. An Alternative Explanation 
So far we have found many explanations based on the pecuniary value of status to be 
inconsistent with our findings. However, there exists another alternative explanation for 
our findings. Suppose, contrary to the signaling model, that the market (or firms) has 
better information about workers’ pecuniary value than the workers themselves. Then 
workers can use their status as a means to learn their own pecuniary value or productivity.  
For example, if a worker’s status decreases (i.e. co-workers get paid relatively 
more), the worker learns that his or her pecuniary (or market) value is higher than what 
he thought. Thus, the worker will demand higher wages and/or leave the firm. Note that 
this prediction is consistent with our findings on status within occupation. 
This  learning  model  is  difficult  to  distinguish  from  social  rewards  theories, 
especially from equity theory, both conceptually  and empirically.  In  equity theory, if 
similar co-workers are getting paid more, people would also think that they are getting 
under-paid, not because they have learned their market wage is higher but because they 
believe their fair (or just) wage is higher. However, if one considers the market wage to 
be a fair, it becomes conceptually difficult to distinguish this learning model from equity 
theory.   37
In order to distinguish these two theories, we follow the wages of those who 
actually leave the firms during M&As. Under the learning model, when expected status 
within occupation decreases, workers quit because they believe they can receive higher 
wages from other firms. However, under social reward theories, such as equity theory, 
workers quit because they are less happy in the merged firm due to unfairness or lower 
prestige.  
Therefore,  under  the  learning  model,  if  workers  expect  lower  status  (within 
occupation) and quit the firm, they must get, on average, larger absolute wages in the new 
firm. On the other hand, under the social preference theories, there is no clear prediction 
on how wages would change after a quit because workers may change firms to get higher 
status within occupation (or lower status within firm) as well as larger absolute wage.  
  Thus,  in  Table  12,  we  analyze  how  the  wage  changes  of  those  who  left  the 
merged firms depend on their expected changes in status had they stayed in the merged 
firms. 
 
[Table 12 here] 
 
From  the  first  column  of  Table  12,  those  who  would  have  had  lower  status  within 
occupation  had  they  stayed  receive  lower  wages  in  their  new  firms  than  others.  As 
discussed above, this finding is not consistent with the learning model. Even when we 
look at cases of voluntary turnover (column [2]) or when we use rational expectations 
(column [3]), the expected change in status within occupation has no significant effect on   38
the wage changes due to turnover. Therefore, our data do not empirically support the 
learning model. 
 
B.  Turnover and Wage Growth 
Previous  analyses  suggest  that  firms  can  mitigate  the  effect  of  status  on  turnover  by 
adjusting  wage  growth.  In  other  words,  if  firms  do  not  compensate  for  the  negative 
change in status within occupation with faster wage growth, the negative change in status 
within occupation leads to more turnover.
30 
  In order to test this hypothesis more directly, we estimate the turnover regression 
in Table 6 and the wage growth regressions in Table 11 for each M&A. Then, we regress 
the  estimated  coefficients  of  ‘E[∆status_firm]’  in  the  turnover  regressions  on  the 
estimated coefficients of ‘E[∆status_firm]’ in the wage regressions. We also repeat the 
regression for the coefficients of ‘E[∆status_occup]’  as follows: 
 
     ∆status_ irm   
         =    +    ∗      ∆status_ irm   
      +     
     ∆status_occup   
         =     +     ∗      ∆status_occup   
      +     
 
As predicted by the hypothesis, Table 13 shows that both  f b  and  fo b  are significant and 
negative. That is, in M&As where absolute wages are not compensated by a change in 
status, workers are more likely to leave the firm. 
 
[Table 13 here] 
                                                 
30 We thank Yoram Weiss for suggesting this implication.   39
 
  These regressions, however, suffer from an obvious endogeneity problem. For 
example, in some M&As where people may care less about their status, the coefficients 
in both the turnover regression and the wage regression would be smaller. Note, however, 
that this endogeneity would generate a positive bias. Thus, given that  f b  and  fo b  are 
already negative, the correction of the bias would not alter the qualitative interpretation of 
the  regressions.  This  finding  provides  further  evidence  that  workers  care  about  their 




Using M&As as natural experiments, our paper tests (i) whether people care about their 
status at all; (ii) whether they care about status for reasons of social rewards or rather for 
reasons  of  pecuniary  rewards;  and  (iii)  whether  reference  groups  affect  for  workers’ 
preference for status. 
The results provide strong evidence that people care about their status primarily 
for social reward reasons. In the case of M&As, workers compare their present status 
with their expected status in determining whether to exit or stay. Furthermore, workers 
derive their valuation of status from more than one reference group. In particular, our 
results suggest that workers care about their relative standing within at least two distinct 
groups  —  coworkers  in  the  same  occupation  and  coworkers  in  other  occupations  — 
within the firm. Higher status among competing or substitutable workers in the same 
occupation is preferred for social rewards such as prestige, respect, or equity, and lower   40
status among complementary workers or partners in other occupations is preferred for its 
social rewards such as the prestige of working with high quality coworkers. Finally, our 
results  imply  a  market  for  status,  where  the  loss  of  status  can  be  compensated  by 
pecuniary  rewards  or  by  working  with  high-performing  workers  in  other  occupation 
within the firm, or vice versa. 
This  study  is  unprecedented  in  scope  and  detail  covering  more  than  180,000 
individual workers in more than 800 firms. We hope that our analysis of the results will 
provide a solid empirical foundation for theoretical studies on status. The importance and 
the complexity of interactions among status in multiple reference groups have not been 
formally  captured  in  theoretical  models,  and  constitute  an  important  topic  for  future 
research. 
Our results also have direct implications for human resources practices in cases 
such as M&As, as they suggest how firms may avoid losing key personnel during the 
uncertain  period  of  the  merger:  workers  that  lose  out  in  one  dimension  may  be 
compensated  in  another.  If  the  employer  can  differentiate  between  more-  and  less- 
important reference groups, workers’ quits and diminished motivation can be mitigated.   
     41





Code  Levels     
0      Administrative work 
  020  7  General analytical work 
  025  6  Secretarial work, typing and translation 
  060  6  Administrative efficiency improvement and development 
  070  6  Applied data processing, systems analysis and programming 
  075  7  Applied data processing operation 
  076  4  Key punching 
       
1      Production Management 
  100  4  Administration of local plants and branches 
  110  5  Management of production, transportation and maintenance work 
  120  5  Work supervision within production, repairs, transportation and 
maintenance work 
  140  5  Work supervision within building and construction 
  160  4  Administration, production and work supervision within forestry, 
log floating and timber scaling 
       
2      Research and Development 
  200  6  Mathematical work and calculation methodology 
  210  7  Laboratory work 
       
3      Construction and Design 
  310  7  Mechanical and electrical design engineering 
  320  6  Construction and construction programming 
  330  6  Architectural work 
  350  7  Design, drawing and decoration 
  380  4  Photography 
  381  2  Sound technology 
       
4      Technical Methodology, Planning, Control, Service and 
Industrial Preventive Health Care 
  400  6  Production engineering 
  410  7  Production planning 
  415  6  Traffic and transportation planning 
  440  7  Quality control 
  470  6  Technical service 
  480  5  Industrial, preventive health care, fire protection, security, 
industrial civil defense 
       
5      Communications, Library and Archival Work 
  550  5  Information work 
  560  5  Editorial work – publishing   42
  570  4  Editorial work – technical information 
  590  6  Library, archives and documentation 
       
6      Personnel Work 
  600  7  Personnel service 
  620  6  The planning of education, training and teaching 
  640  4  Medical care within industries 
       
7      General Services 
  775  3  Restaurant work 
       
8      Business and Trade 
  800  7  Marketing and sales 
  815  4  Sales within stores and department stores 
  825  4  Travel agency work 
  830  4  Sales at exhibitions, spare part depots etc. 
  835  3  Customer service 
  840  5  Tender calculation 
  850  5  Order processing 
  855  4  The internal processing of customer requests 
  860  5  Advertising 
  870  7  Buying 
  880  6  Management of inventory and sales 
  890  6  Shipping and freight services 
       
9      Financial Work and Office Services 
  900  7  Financial administration 
  920  6  Management of housing and real estate 
  940  6  Auditing 
  970  4  Telephone work 
  985  6  Office services 
  986  1  Chauffeuring 
   43
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Table 1  Theory of Status 
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Table 2  Predictions of Alternative Theories 
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Table 3  Summary Statistics 
(a) 
(b) 
!ote: Standard deviations are in parentheses. ‘firm size’ is measured by the number of white-collar workers 
in the company. ‘wage’ is the monthly real wage in 1970 Kronor. ‘turnover1’ is a dummy variable for those 
who quit within one year after a merger. ‘turnover3’ is a dummy variable for those who quit within three 
years. 
   
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
firm size 492.18 (902.62) 433.76 (851.85) 58.41 (120.43)




Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
age 40.231 (11.464) 40.291 (11.452) 39.553 (11.584)
rank 5.471 (1.247) 5.463 (1.252) 5.562 (1.182)
female 0.238 0.238 0.240
wage 3161.301 (1255.695) 3172.104 (1260.394) 3039.487 (1194.732)
turnover1 0.124 0.121 0.155
turnover3 0.331 0.326 0.392
# of observations
Combined Acquirer Acquired
186679 171473 15206  51
 
Table 4  Computation of Expected Status: An Example 
 
Note: This table shows how we compute expected post-merger status based on wages before the merger. 
Ranking shows the relative ranking (=n/N according to the notations in from equation (3)). Our status 
measure, equation (3), is in the parenthesis. For example, a worker with wage 1600 in the acquiring firm 
occupation 310 has status 1.39 within occupation and 1.10 within firm before merger. However, if two 
firms  merge,  holding  wage  constant,  the  worker’s  status  after  the  merger  will  become  1.79  within 
occupation and 1.61 within firm. 
   
1600 3/3 (1.39) 4/5 (1.10) 5/5 (1.79) 8/9 (1.61)
1500 2/3 (0.69) 3/5 (0.69) 4/5 (1.10) 6/9 (0.92)
1400 1/3 (0.29) 2/5 (0.41) 2/5 (0.41) 4/9 (0.51)
1700 2/2 (1.10) 5/5 (1.79) 4/4 (1.61) 9/9 (2.30)
1300 1/2 (0.41) 1/5 (0.18) 2/4 (0.51) 3/9 (0.36)
1450 2/2 (1.10) 3/4 (0.92) 3/5 (0.69) 5/9 (0.69)
1200 1/2 (0.41) 2/4 (0.51) 1/5 (0.18) 2/9 (0.22)
1550 2/2 (1.10) 4/4 (1.61) 3/4 (0.92) 7/9 (1.20)


















Table 5  Summary Statistics for Status Measures 
 
(a) Mean and Standard Deviation 
 
(b) Correlation Matrix 
!ote:  Standard  deviations  are  in  parentheses.  ‘status_firm’  measures  status  within  firm  right  before  a 
merger, following equation (3). ‘abs(E[∆status_firm])’ measures the absolute value of the expected change 
in status within firm. Similarly, ‘status_occup’ measures status within an occupation inside a firm right 
before a merger.  
   
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
status_firm 0.989 (0.961) 0.989 (0.966) 0.986 (0.903)
status_occup 0.969 (0.909) 0.971 (0.914) 0.946 (0.847)
abs(E[Δstatus_firm]) 0.030 (0.080) 0.020 (0.046) 0.147 (0.198)




Wage Status_f E[Δstatus_firm] Status_fo E[Δstatus_occup]
Wage 1
status_firm 0.9185 1
E[Δstatus_firm] 0.1025 0.0241 1
status_occup 0.6822 0.7466 0.0074 1
E[Δstatus_occup] 0.1022 0.0697 0.5334 0.0162 1  53
Table 6  Expected Change in Status and Turnover: Probit Analysis 
(dependent variable = 1 if quit the firm within two years after M&A, = 0 otherwise) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses and adjusted for clustering within acquisitions.  
 
!ote: Each regression includes rank dummies (6), occupation dummies (67), industry dummies (33), year 
dummies (18), and region dummies (24). ‘firm size’ measures the firm size right after the merger. ‘firm 
size  change’  measures  the  ratio  of  actual  post-merger  firm  size  to  the  sum  of  pre-merger  firm  sizes. 
‘occupation size change’ measures the ratio of occupation size in the post-merger firm to the sum of pre-
merger occupation sizes. ‘location change’  measures the ratio of the number of workers who move to 
different regional code after the merger. ‘wage dispersion’ measures the standard deviation of wages within 
firm. ‘wage dispersion change’ measures the actual change of wage dispersion after the merger. 
   
[1] [2] [3]
E[Change in Status_firm] 0.097 0.184
(0.043)** (0.050)***






Age  -0.184 -0.183 -0.183
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Age-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Female -0.084 -0.080 -0.079
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
Part Time 0.304 0.293 0.284
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Wage (1K) 0.008 0.031 0.011
(0.011) (0.008)*** (0.011)
Acquired 0.010 0.014 0.012
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Firm Size (1K) -0.140 -0.140 -0.140
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Firm Size-squared 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Firm Size Change -0.017 -0.018 -0.016
(0.009)* (0.009)** (0.009)*
Occupation Size Change -2.329 -2.332 -2.330
(0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)***
Location Change 0.343 0.342 0.341
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Wage Dispersion -0.007 -0.008 -0.007
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Wage Dispersion Change 0.018 0.012 0.018
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Observations 186679 186679 186679
Pseudo R-squared 0.1396 0.1400 0.1401
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  54
 
Table 7  Actual Change of Status and Turnover: Probit Analysis 
(dependent variable = 1 if quit the firm within two years after M&A, = 0 otherwise) 
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses and adjusted for clustering within acquisitions.  
 
!ote: In these regressions, the actual changes in status between right before and right after M&As are used, 
instead  of  expected  changes.  Each  regression  includes  rank  dummies,  occupation  dummies,  industry 
dummies, year dummies, and region dummies. The selection regression in column [1] includes all the same 
control variables except that the expected changes in status are used instead of the actual changes. In IV-
probit estimation (column [2]), actual changes in status are instrumented by expected changes in status. 
Heckman 2-step IV-estimation
[1] [2]
Change in Status_firm 0.134 0.257
(0.030)*** (0.056)***












Part Time 0.281 0.254
(0.017)*** (0.031)***
Wage (1K) -0.004 -0.001
(0.013) (0.016)




Firm Size (1K) -0.164 -0.149
(0.009)*** (0.019)***
Firm Size-squared 0.009 0.007
(0.001)*** (0.002)***
Firm Size Change -0.013 -0.017
(0.011) (0.011)
Occupation Size Change -1.592 -0.862
(0.080)*** (0.028)***
Location Change 0.176 0.062
(0.021)*** (0.031)**
Wage Dispersion -0.009 -0.010
(0.002)*** (0.003)***
Wage Dispersion Change 0.019 0.022
(0.005)*** (0.005)***
Observations 186679 161640
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  55
Table 8  Voluntary Quits 
(dependent variable = 1 if quit the firm within two years after M&A, = 0 otherwise) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses and adjusted for clustering within acquisitions.  
 
!ote: The independent variables are the same as those in column [3] in Table 6. The coefficients of other 
variables are not reported. 
 
Table 9  Different Measures of Status 
(dependent variable = 1 if quit the firm within two years after M&A, = 0 otherwise) 
 Standard errors are in parentheses and adjusted for clustering within acquisitions.  
 
!ote: The independent variables are the same as those in column [3] in Table 6. The coefficients of other 
variables are not reported. 
   
Exclude if firm size drop real wage drop less wage growth
[1] [2] [3]
E[Change in Status_firm] 0.153 0.201 0.074
(0.056)*** (0.063)*** (0.074)
E[Change in Status_occup] -0.137 -0.110 -0.109
(0.036)*** (0.041)*** (0.047)**
Status_firm 0.036 0.010 0.037
(0.015)** (0.016) (0.016)**
Status_occup -0.085 -0.083 -0.088
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)***
Observations 163953 158063 151157
Pseudo R-squared 0.1199 0.1643 0.1679
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Wage Rank Deviation Hierarchy Rank Rational Exp.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
E[Change in Status_firm] 0.528 0.079 0.120 0.126
(0.178)*** (0.068) (0.044)*** (0.034)***
E[Change in Status_occup] -0.443 -0.243 -0.106 -0.091
(0.109)*** (0.045)*** (0.040)*** (0.024)***
Status_firm -0.126 -0.198 -0.020 0.087
(0.041)*** (0.026)*** (0.013) (0.014)***
Status_occup -0.201 -0.038 -0.035 -0.106
(0.025)*** (0.011)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)***
Observations 186679 186679 186679 167619
Pseudo R-squared 0.1402 0.1401 0.1396 0.1239
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  56
Table 10  Specification Test 
(dependent variable = 1 if quit the firm within two years after M&A, = 0 otherwise) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses and adjusted for clustering within acquisitions.  
 
!ote: All the independent variables in column [3] in Table 6 are also controlled. The coefficients of other 
variables are not reported. 
 
   
Hypothetical Tenure Distance
[1] [2] [3]
E[Change in Status_firm] -0.062 0.400 0.163
(0.085) (0.094)*** (0.050)***
E[Change in Status_occup] 0.010 -0.144 -0.123
(0.059) (0.073)* (0.033)***
Status_firm 0.037 0.104 0.040
(0.025) (0.029)*** (0.014)***


















Observations 70322 44578 186679
Pseudo R-squared 0.1181 0.1877 0.1507
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  57
Table 11  Status and Pay 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses and adjusted for clustering within acquisitions.  
 
!ote: Each regression includes age, gender, part time dummy, occupation dummy, firm size, industry dummy, year 
dummy,  and  region  dummy.  Heckman  first-stage  (selection)  regression  includes  change  in  firm  size,  change  in 
occupation size, and ratio of location change as well as all the same control variables in OLS. 
   
OLS
[1] [2] [3]
E[Change in Status_firm] 0.045 0.042 0.046
(0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.012)***
E[Change in Status_occup] -0.020 -0.020 -0.020
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Status_firm 0.029 0.028 0.030
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)***
Status_occup -0.009 -0.009 -0.008
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Age  -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001)** (0.001)* (0.001)*
Age-squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000)*
Female -0.049 -0.049 -0.049
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Part Time 0.084 0.084 0.084
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Wage (1K) -0.054 -0.054 -0.055
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Acquired 0.009 0.010 0.008
(0.006) (0.005)* (0.006)
Firm Size (1K) 0.000 0.001 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm Size-squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance Measures no no yes
Observations 124898 186679 186679
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Heckman 2-step  58
Table 12  Wage Change of Leavers 





Standard errors are in parentheses and adjusted for clustering within acquisitions.  
 
!ote:  Each  regression  includes  age,  gender,  part  time  dummy,  occupation  dummy,  firm  size,  industry 
dummy, M&A year dummy, firm change year dummy, and region dummy.  Naïve expectation is based on 
the  expectation  that  all  workers  will  remain  after  M&A.  Rational  expectation  is  based  on  the  ex-post 
correct expectation on who will remain after M&A. See page 23 for more details. Voluntary turnovers are 









Note: Variables are the estimated coefficients from the turnover analysis in Table 6 and wage growth 
analyses in Table 11,estimated by each acquisition. Weighted regressions use the size of M&A (measured 
by the total number white collar employee right before M&A) as the weights.
All Turnover Voluntary Turnover All Turnover Voluntary Turnover
Acquired 1.1847 14.992 -0.6944 8.006
(14.248) (16.0480) (15.989) (16.877)
status_firm 61.206**  118.238*** 111.324*** 144.251***
(30.48) (30.1690) (42.114) (34.748)
E[Δstatus_firm] 14.775 148.396*** 132.39** 266.539***
(55.5380) ( 51.623) (73.672) (45.435)
status_occup -.7475   -4.5813 -17.735 -20.264
(9.447) ( 9.216) (16.271) (15.234)
E[Δstatus_occup]  64.75* 15.563 -62.228 -54.328
(35.29) ( 33.335) (45.286) (44.420)
Number of Observations 16448 11636 10811 7972
R-squared 0.1977 0.2367 0.1954 0.2165
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Naïve Expectation Rational Expectation
OLS Weighted OLS Weighted
coef_E[Δstatus_firm] (wageG) -3.3210*** -4.2407***
(0.2576) (0.1745)
coef_E[Δstatus_occup] (wageG) -1.6580*** -1.5718***
(0.4638) (0.4019)
constant -1.4874 -3.2633 -0.4528 -0.4095
(1.1986) (1.2927) (0.6769) (0.4469)
N 227 227 227 227
R-squared 0.4249 0.7242 0.0537 0.0595
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
dependent variable
coef_E[Δstatus_firm] (turnover) coef_E[Δstatus_occup] (turnover)59 
 
Figure 1  ;umber of M&A and ;umber of Workers Involved 
 
 











































# of M&A # of workers involved.60 
 
 




(a) Change in Status within Firm 
 
 
(b) Change in Status within Occupation 
 
Note: “Change in Status” measures the absolute value of actual change in status (from the previous year) within firm 
or occupation. M&A take place between year 0 and year 1. The dotted lines after year 0 show the statistics of the 
remaining workers from acquirer or acquired firms and newly hired workers after M&A. “Average” before year 0 is 
the average among workers in acquirer and acquired firms. “Average” after year 0 is the average of all the workers 
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